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HIS is the first year the Texas Survey has devoted a chapter solely
to health care law. The introduction of this topic to the Survey
occurs during a period of intense interest both locally and nation-
ally as "health care reform" has been the subject of considerable debate
in Congress and the state legislature. The magnitude of this intensity on
the federal level is general public knowledge given the media exposure to
the many hearings and discussions by President Clinton's Task Force.
That Task Force ultimately produced the 1342-page Health Security Act
that was hotly debated but not passed by either House of Congress.
At the state level, the same degree of intensity occurred during the
73rd Texas legislative session where twenty health care agencies were
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subject to sunset review' and approximately six hundred bills affecting
hospitals were filed.2 Of those filed, some 150 were enacted, most be-
coming effective on September 1, 1993.3
Although the purpose of the Survey is to identify developments that
have arisen in Texas, some of the following discussion will include matters
that emanate from federal law, regulation, and Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit cases that relate to Texas. For purposes of this initial article,
health care law issues will cover the period between August 30, 1993 and
December 31, 1994. This review period has been extended back to in-
clude 1993 legislation and forward a few months to include significant
recent developments.
The scope of "health care law" is not a precise body of law but is best
defined by the issues affecting the various participants in the field. In a
general sense, participants do one of the following: provide care, receive
care, pay for care, or regulate payors or providers of care. Even though
tort claims are related to patient care, this Article will not deal with issues
involving medical malpractice or products liability except to the extent
that a related issue affects the operation or mode of business of the par-
ticular participant.
Organizationally, this Article will discuss matters on a subject issue ba-
sis since one or more participants may be involved in any particular sub-
ject issue. Where a subject area has substantial recent legislative change,
the subject area will be separated into case law and legislative/regulatory
change.
I. DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING AIDS
A. RIGHTS RELATED TO HIV-INFECTED HEALTHCARE WORKERS
The right to reassign a healthcare worker with a communicable disease
was upheld in Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer
Center.4 The HIV-infected worker who served as a surgical assistant in-
volved in invasive procedures was reassigned to a position that did not
involve patient care. The worker objected to the reassignment and filed
suit, claiming discrimination.
The Fifth Circuit, in hearing the worker's appeal, applied the Rehabili-
tation Act of 19735 to determine whether he was "otherwise qualified" to
perform the functions of a surgical assistant in spite of his HIV infection.
1. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 325.001-325.024 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1995). Sunset
review is a process required by the legislature to review the necessity of the particular
agency and whether its purposes and methodologies should be modified or whether the
agency should be consolidated with another or abolished.
2. CHARLES BAILEY ET AL., NEW HEALTH CARE LAws: A REPORT ON THE 73RD
TEXAS LEGISLATURE (Ann Ward ed., Texas Hosp. Assoc. 1993).
3. Hugh M. Barton, Changes in the Law Will Affect Physicians, TEX. MED., Dec.
1993, at 43.
4. No. Civ. A. H-92-189, 1993 WL 413143 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 1071 (1994).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (Rehabilitation Act).
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In arriving at its support for the reassignment, the court made the follow-
ing observations and findings:
1. Although infected blood could transmit the disease from the
worker to the patient, it was too speculative to determine the
probability of such a transmission;
2. even though the probability was uncertain, the risk was not so low
considering the seriousness of a resultant infection; and
3. since the risk of even a low probability transmission could be dis-
astrous, the worker was not "otherwise qualified" as a surgical
assistant.
4. There was no duty upon the hospital to find the worker another
position because it could not make "reasonable accommodations"
to reduce the risks associated with the "essential functions" re-
quired as a surgical assistant. 6
B. REFUSAL TO TREAT AIDs PATIENTS
As a general rule, health care providers, including physicians and den-
tists, are free to decide which patients they wish to treat. This free choice
is subject to limitations involving constitutionally prohibited discrimina-
tions if the provider participates in state or federal payment programs
such as Medicare or Medicaid. In a recent case, United States v. Jack
Castle, D.D.S.,7 the court held that patients who are HIV-infected are
subject to the protections afforded by the Americans with Disabilities
Act. This case involved the denial of treatment to a patient who had
answered a questionnaire that he was HIV-positive. The case was settled
by agreement with the Department of Justice; the terms involved pay-
ment of $80,000 compensatory damages and $20,000 in civil penalties,
although there was no admission of violation of the ADA since Dr. Castle
asserted that the staff that took the actions were not authorized by policy
or procedure to do so.
II. ANTITRUST
A. LEGISLATION
Amendments to the Health and Safety Code provide for the develop-
ment of cooperative agreements among hospitals that allocate health care
equipment, facilities, personnel, or services. 8 This legislation permits dis-
cussion and negotiation with respect to the cooperative agreement, but
does not authorize the merger of facilities or discussion of price-fixing or
predatory pricing.
A cooperative agreement requires that the parties to the agreement
apply to the Texas Department of Health (TDH if seeking to obtain a
6. 3 F.3d at 924-25.
7. No. H-93-31450 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 1994) (case settled).
8. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 313.001-.008 (Vernon Supp. 1995) ("Co-
operative Agreements Among Hospitals").
1995] 1307
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certificate of public advantage (certificate). 9 In the application to TDH
for the certificate, TDH will evaluate the potential advantages and disad-
vantages of the proposed agreement to determine whether any of the fol-
lowing would occur:
A. Advantages' 0
1. Enhance quality of care,
2. preserve availability of services to a specific area,
3. increase cost efficiency of services,
4. improve utilization of hospital resources and equipment, and
5. avoid duplication of resources.
B. Disadvantages 1'
1. Difficulty caused by a cooperative agreement which would inter-
fere with or reduce the likelihood of health maintenance organi-
zations, preferred provider organizations, or other payors of
health services being able to contract with providers of health
care,
2. any reduction in competition among providers of services or
goods that compete with those involved in the cooperative
agreement,
3. negative effects on the quality, availability, or price of services to
patients, and
4. restrictions on the availability of arrangements that are competi-
tive to the cooperative agreement.
The process of review and determination by TDH may involve public
hearings but must involve consultation with the Attorney General to as-
sess anticompetitive effects. At any time before, during, or after the
granting of a certificate, either TDH or the Attorney General may seek
review and cancellation of the certificate if circumstances change such
that the benefits of the agreement no longer outweigh the disadvantages
of the arrangement.
B. REGULATIONS
Regulations adopted by the TDH amplified on the enabling legislation
related to co-operative agreements (Agreement) between hospitals.' 2
The regulations clarified that only facilities licensed by TDH could sub-
mit co-operative agreements for review and approval.' 3 The application
requirements were enumerated' 4 and also specified that the agreement
was to be fully executed by all parties.' 5
9. Id § 313.002(b).
10. Id § 313.002(e)(1)-(5).
11. Id. § 313.002(f)(1)-(4) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
12. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 134.101 (West 1995).
13. Id. § 134.101(b)(1)(A).
14. Id. § 134.101(b)(2).
15. Id. § 134.101(b)(1)(C).
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Application requirements that were distinctive amplifications of the
enabling legislation include the following:16
1. An identification of the steps necessary for a potential competitor
of the Agreement to enter into the relevant market;
2. a historical description of the business transactions of the parties
to the Agreement that relate to the subject of the Agreement;
3. an explanation of the effects of the Agreement on each party in-
cluding volume, price, and revenue;
4. a description of the market share of the parties to the Agreement
and other providers of the same service before and as projected
after implementation of the Agreement; and
5. an explanation of why efficiencies could not be achieved without
implementation of the Agreement.
In addition to the preceding requirements, TDH may deny an applica-
tion if it determines that "there is not clear and convincing evidence that
the likely benefits resulting from the agreement outweigh any disadvan-
tages attributable to a reduction in competition .... -17
III. BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS
A. NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS
The 1993 legislative session modified the part of the Business and Com-
merce Code relating to covenants not to compete. 18 The revision allows
a covenant not to compete to be part of an otherwise enforceable agree-
ment without the payment of additional consideration.19 If the agree-
ment is found to contain unreasonable limitations as to time, geographic
area, or scope of activity to be restrained a court may reform the agree-
ment to appropriately protect the business interests of the person or en-
tity benefitting from the covenant.20 The revision also specifically is
made applicable to agreements for a term or at will.2 '
B. NON-PROFIT HEALTH CORPORATIONS
The label "Non-profit health corporation" (NPHC) is an industry
coined term used for a type of "state" non-profit corporation that meets
certain requirements of the Medical Practice Act (MPA)22 and has been
reviewed and certified by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners
(TSBME). 23 It is also frequently referred to as a "5.01(a)" corporation
16. Id. § 134.101(b)(2)(0)-(s).
17. Id. § 134.101(c).
18. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
19. Id.
20. See General Devices, Inc. v. Bacon, 836 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991,
writ denied) (citing Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex.
1960)).
21. Id But see Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Texas, 883 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1994)(at-will employment agreement not sufficient consideration for covenant not to compete).
22. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b § 5.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
23. Id. at 501(b).
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because its organizational documents and structure conform to specifica-
tions in section 5.01(a) of the MPA.
Although this type of corporate structure has been authorized for
many years, its utilization was minimal until recently. Much attention has
been focused on this legal structure as a mechanism for the employment
of physicians by a corporation which is otherwise prohibited by the
MPA.24 Except for this corporate form, the only other mechanism for
employment of a physician is by another physician or by a professional
association composed entirely of physicians.
This non-profit health corporation structure, in an indirect manner, al-
lows a person or entity other than a physician to be involved in the em-
ployment of the physician. This is possible since the Texas Non-Profit
Corporations Act 25 permits a state non-profit corporation to be organ-
ized either with or without "members. '26 The member of the typical
NPHC is a corporate entity such as a hospital.
In the development of the NPHC's organizational and structural de-
sign, the member often reserves many powers including the right to ap-
point the board of directors or trustees (Board) of the corporation. To
meet the requirements of 5.01(a) of the MPA, all of the Board directors
or trustees must be physicians practicing full time and licensed by
TSBME.
Because of concerns expressed by various associations that the current
arrangements may allow a corporate entity to unduly influence an em-
ployed physician's exercise of independent medical judgment, the
TSBME has proposed a number of regulatory changes27 that would affect
the organizational design that many existing NPHC's have incorporated.
The regulations are intended to minimize the possible influence that a
corporate member might have on the activities of the corporation, its
board of directors, or employees that involve the practice of medicine.
Since one of the principal uses of a NPHC is the employment of physi-
cians,28 those regulatory changes that relate to this purpose are outlined
as follows: 29
1. The "full-time" practice of medicine which is a requirement for an
individual to serve as a member of the governing board is ex-
panded to include those activities dealing with professional, man-
agerial, administrative, or supervisory activities related to the
practice of medicine or delivery of health care services. 30
24. Id. § 3.08(15).
25. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1396 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1995) (Non-profit
Corporation Act).
26. Id. art. 1396-2.08.
27. 19 Tex. Reg. 9826 (1994) (if adopted to be codified at 22 TEx. ADMIN. CODE
§ 177.1 (Texas State Board of Medical Examiners)).
28. It should also be noted that another purpose of an NPCH is its ability to enter into
certain "risk-sharing" contracts without the NPCH having to be licensed as an HMO. See
Tax. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.26 § (f)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
29. 19 Tex. Reg. 9826-9828 (1994).
30. id. at 9826-27 (to be codified at 22 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 177.1(a)(4).
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2. The physicians who serve as the initial incorporators for purposes
of becoming a non-profit corporation would have the right to se-
lect the initial governing board members.3 '
3. Appointment of governing board members after the initial gov-
erning board by the "corporate member" must receive approval
by a majority of the physician governing board.32
4. Activities of the corporation that involve credentialing, quality as-
surance, utilization review, and peer review are the exclusive do-
main of the physician governing board; financial matters can be
limited to the discretion of the corporate member.33
5. Any decision to terminate a physician's employment contract with
the NPHC must be approved by the physician governing board
and would be subject to any "due process" requirements adopted
by the governing board4
6. A physician governing board member can be removed by the
"corporate member" only "for cause" as stated in the NPHC by-
laws; "for cause" can not involve matters relating to credentialing,
quality assurance, utilization review, peer review, or the practice
of medicine.35
7. The "corporate member" can not unilaterally amend the NPHC
bylaws and must receive a majority approval from the physician
governing board.36
8. Annual reporting requires submission of various types of informa-
tion including financial relationships between the physician board
members and the "corporate member" of the NPHC.37
9. The TSBME is authorized to withhold or revoke a NPHC's certi-
fication if the NPHC does not meet the requirements of section
5.01a of the Medical Practice Act.38
These proposed rules will be subject to public comment during the
spring of 1995, when the TSBME expects to take final action.
C. REIMBURSEMENT
In a transaction between two corporate entities in which the acquiring
entity assumed no liabilities in the purchase according to state law, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Vernon Home Health,
Inc. held that federal regulations could impose liability on the acquiring
entity.39 In this transaction, the acquiring entity accepted transfer of the
selling entity's Medicare provider number. In the course of a periodic
audit review it was determined that the selling entity had been overpaid
by the Medicare program during the operation of home health agency by
the seller. Even though the liability for repayment would have been di-
31. Id. at 9827 (to be codified at 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 177.1(b)(1)).
32. Id. (to be codified at 22 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 177.1(b)(4)).
33. ld (to be codified at 22 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 177.1(b)(5)).
34. Id. (to be codified at 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 177.1(b)(6)).
35. Id. (to be codified at 22 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 177.1(b)(7)).
36. Id. (to be codified at 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 177.1(b)(8)).
37. Id. (to be codified at 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 177.1(c)).
38. Id. at 9828 (to be codified at 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 177.1(i)).
39. 21 F.3d 693, 696 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 575 (1994).
19951 1311
SMU LAW REVIEW
rected to the seller, state law was preempted by federal Medicare regula-
tions.40 Thus, the acquiring entity was held to be liable for repayment. 41
Had the acquiring entity not accepted an assignment of the predecessor's
Medicare provider number, liability would not have been imposed on the
acquiror.42
D. RELEASE OF PATIENT ACCIDENT INFORMATION
Legislation passed in 1993 prohibiting the release of information on
patients involved in auto accidents43 was ruled unconstitutional in Moore
v. Morales." In the same decision, Judge Hittner also struck down a simi-
lar piece of new legislation 45 which limited the release of auto accident
information for 180 days from the date of the accident.46 The laws were
intended to protect accident injured individuals from solicitation by law-
yers and other individuals during a time of distress.47 The lawsuit was
initiated by businesses that review information maintained by public
agencies responsible for accident and criminal offense monitoring. 48 The
businesses claimed that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
under the United States Constitution were violated by the legislation. 49
The court ruled that the legislation exceeded limitations on commercial
speech approved by the United States Supreme Court.50 The court also
determined that the purpose of the legislation in preventing deceptive or
misleading communications was not served by imposing time limits. 51
The court further held that privacy rights of individuals were not pro-
tected by the new legislation since the information subject to the new
state laws was available through other public means including insurance
companies. 52
IV. CONSENT TO TREATMENT
A. ALTERNATE DECISION MAKERS FOR INCOMPETENT PATIENTS
The Consent to Medical Treatment Act was passed by the 1993 Legisla-
ture as amendments to the Texas Health and Safety Code.53 Prior to this
legislation there was no valid manner in which someone other than an
adult patient himself could consent for medical treatment unless that
40. Id. at 695 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
41. 21 F.3d at 696.
42. Id
43. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 38.12(d)(2)(A)-(C), 38.12(e) (Vernon 1994).
44. 843 F.Supp. 1124 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
45. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d § 47(a), (b), (c), (f) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
46. 843 F. Supp. at 1133.
47. Id at 1127.
48. Id. at 1125.
49. Id.
50. 843 F. Supp. at 1126, 1133.
51. Id at 1126-27, 1133.
52. Id at 1129-30, 1133.
53. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 313.002-.007 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (Con-
sent to Medical reatment Act).
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adult had appointed an agent under a Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care,54 or other specific circumstances were applicable such as an
emergency where consent is implied55 or the patient met the require-
ments of the Natural Death Act.5 6 In spite of this situation, many con-
sent forms were signed by next of kin, which gave the health care
providers involved in rendering care some sense of believing they were
protected. Although technically, no valid consent existed by these next of
kin consents, the providers were acting on the belief that the next of kin
were acting in the best interests of the patient and expressing the wishes
of the patient. These provisions clarify who and under what circum-
stances decisions can be made for patients who are not competent.
1. Circumstances when this Act does not apply:57
A. a court appointed guardian has been given authority to make
decisions;
B. a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care has been executed
which designates agents to make decisions;
C. the medical treatment decisions involve the withholding or with-
drawing of life support which is subject to the Natural Death
Act;58 or
D. the medical treatment involves voluntary inpatient mental health
services, electro-convulsive treatment, or the appointment of an-
other alternate decisionmaker.59
The Act does not affect existing law related to treatment of individuals
in emergency conditions,6° the treatment of minors,61 and consent with
respect to transfer to another facility.62
2. Patient Qualifications of the Act:63
A. the individual must be a patient at a nursing home or at a hospi-
tal for inpatient services;
B. the patient is "incompetent" meaning that the individual is inca-
pacitated, comatose, or incapable of communication; and
C. the patient is in need of medical treatment according to reason-
able medical judgment which includes preventive care.
54. TEx. Cv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.001-.018 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
55. TEx. HEALTh & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 773.008 (Vernon 1992).
56. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001-.021 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995)
(Natural Death Act).
57. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.003 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
58. Id
59. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(d)(1)-(3) (Vernon 1992).
60. 1& § 313.003(a)(4).
61. Id § 313.003(a)(3).
62. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.003(a)(5).
63. Id § 313.005.
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3. Alternate Decision Makers:
If the requirements of the Act are met, and no exception is applicable,
the Act then lists in order of priority those individuals who may make
decisions based upon the patient's wishes, if known: 64
A. the patient's spouse;
B. the patient's adult child who has the waiver and consent of all
other qualified adult children of the patient to act as the sole
decisionmaker;
C. a majority of the patient's reasonably available adult children;
D. the patient's parents; or
E. the individual clearly identified to act for the patient by the pa-
tient before the patient became incapacitated, the patient's near-
est living relative, or a member of the clergy.
4. Physician Requirements. 65
A. The patient's competency and medical condition must be de-
scribed in the medical record.
B. Reasonable efforts to contact the alternate decision makers must
be documented in the record.
C. Documentation of the consent obtained from the alternate deci-
sionmakers should be executed on appropriate consent forms.
If the foregoing requirements are met and all decisions are made in
good faith, the health care providers involved in the care rendered are
immune from civil or criminal liability with respect to consent issues.66
B. AGE OF CONSENT FOR BLOOD DONATION
The age of consent for blood donation has been lowered from eighteen
years to seventeen years of age.67 A blood bank, however, may not pay a
person younger than eighteen years of age for a donation of blood or
blood components.
C. LIMITATION ON POWERS OF GUARDIAN
The Texas Probate Code was amended in 1993, revising substantially
the provisions dealing with guardianship. 68 The provision conferring au-
thority on the guardian to make health care decisions is broad, including
medical, psychiatric, and surgical treatment other than in-patient psychi-
atric care. 69
64. Id § 313.004(a)(1)-(5).
65. Id. § 313.005.
66. Id § 313.007.
67. Id
68. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 767 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
69. Id. § 767(4).
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D. SURROGATE DECISIONMAKERS FOR RESIDENTS OF MENTAL
HEALTH FACILITIES
Amendments to the Health and Safety Code provide for a process to
appoint a surrogate health care decisionmaker for residents of an inter-
mediate care facility serving the mentally retarded. 70 An appointment
can be made after an assessment of a resident indicates that the resident
is not capable of making treatment decisions.71
1. Decisionmakers
The following priority lists those who can serve as surrogate deci-
sionmakers: (1) an actively involved spouse, (2) an actively involved adult
child who has the waiver and consent of all other actively involved chil-
dren, (3) an actively involved parent or stepparent, (4) an actively in-
volved adult sibling who has the waiver and consent of all other actively
involved adult siblings, and (5) an actively involved adult relative who has
the waiver and consent of all other actively involved adult relatives.72
When there is no surrogate available or willing to serve in this capacity, a
surrogate consent committee which is subject to specific membership
qualifications and limitations can be established to make treatment
decisions.73
2. Circumstances When Surrogates Decide
A surrogate may exercise decision making authority when the resident
requires major medical or dental treatment that has a significant recovery
period, presents a significant risk, employs a general anesthetic, or in-
volves a significant invasion of bodily integrity requiring extraction of
bodily fluids or an incision, or that produces substantial pain, discomfort,
or debilitation.74
3. Limitations on Decisionmaking
The surrogate may not make health care decisions involving: (1) exper-
imental research, (2) abortion, (3) sterilization, or (4) electroconvulsive
treatment.75 The surrogate may not make decisions about management
of client funds.76
V. CONTRACT DEVELOPMENTS
An exclusive contract arrangement between a hospital and physician
was challenged in a lawsuit appealed to the Texarkana Court of Ap-
70. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 597.001-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
71. Id
72. Id § 597.041(a)(1)-(5).
73. I § 597.042.
74. Id. §§ 597.001(6), 597.041(a).




peals.77 Dr. Gonzalez's practice was essentially eliminated at the hospital
since he was not associated with the physician who obtained the exclusive
contract for anesthesiology services. In the suit he claimed that contract
rights were breached, business relations were tortiously damaged, and re-
straint of trade was involved in the exclusive arrangement.78 While the
court's opinion on the restraint of trade claim applied existing precedent
from the Jefferson Parish79 case,80 the court did create new implications in
the breach of contract issue8' and affirmed the hospital's course of action
for those matters claimed to involve tortious interference. 82
A. BREACH OF CONTRACT
Dr. Gonzalez claimed that the hospital's governing bylaws which estab-
lished a procedure for hearing and appeal were breached when he was
effectively denied the right to practice at the hospital without such a hear-
ing. The hospital contended that the case was controlled by Weary v.
Baylor University Hospital 3 and its progeny, which held that medical
staff bylaws did not create contractual rights. The Gonzalez court, how-
ever, made the distinction between medical staff bylaws and hospital gov-
erning board bylaws in holding the hospital governing board bylaws did
create such rights.8 4 It did note that these "contract rights" did not guar-
antee work for any physician nor did they limit the hospital's right to
conduct business including exclusive contracting.8 5
The court also considered the basis for which hearings and appeals
were made available and decided that since neither professional compe-
tence nor ethical conduct were at issue, there was no reason for Dr. Gon-
zalez to be afforded a hearing. 86 It determined that his privileges and
membership at the hospital continued in place and that his ability to ob-
tain work which had been affected was not the basis for a hearing.87
B. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
The court reviewed the exclusive contract and determined that it was a
reasonable exercise of the board's power to provide proper management
of the hospital.88 The court also found persuasive the commonly cited
arguments for entering into an exclusive arrangement for hospital-based
physician services such as simplification of administrating the anesthesiol-
77. Gonzalez v. San Jacinto Methodist Hospital, 880 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1994, writ denied).
78. Id.
79. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
80. 880 S.W.2d at 441-43.
81. Id. at 438-40.
82. Id. at 440-41.
83. 360 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
84. 880 S.W.2d 438-39.
85. Id. at 439-40.
86. Id. at 440.
87. Id.
88. 880 S.W.2d at 441.
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ogy department, assuring coverage of professional services, and standard-
ization of procedures.8 9
C. RESTRAINT OF TRADE
In following the Jefferson Parish90 case, the court determined that the
impact on the market place rather than the impact on the ability of the
physician to practice was the issue to be resolved.91 Since Gonzalez
presented no evidence of adverse effects on the availability of anesthesi-




The federal district court in Johnson v. El Paso Pathology Group,
P.A. 93 found that a pathologist who was employed by an independent
group of pathologists, and who also served as the hospital's medical direc-
tor of the pathology department, could be considered an employee of the
hospital as well as an employee of the pathology group.94 Since Dr. John-
son was considered to be subject to joint employers, claims raised by Dr.
Johnson of sexual discrimination against the hospital served as the basis
for the hospital's liability.
The specific claims involved a hostile work environment, and her termi-
nation for refusing to accept a less desirable position than medical direc-
tor. The determination that the hospital and group should be considered
"joint employers" derived from the relationship between the hospital and
group.95 Considerable control by the hospital over the group existed
both in the day to day operations of the pathology lab and in explicit
contract language in a services agreement between them.96
Among the various control factors that the hospital could exert over
the group included the right to approve who the group hired and fired,
the appointment of the hospital as the sole agent for numerous business
matters including management and administration of the group's business
affairs, and the right to approve the group's obligations exceeding
$1000. 9 7 This amount was small compared to annual revenues of the
group which generally exceeded $1,000,000.98 These factors taken to-
89. Id.
90. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
91. Id. at 442.
92. Id. at 442-43.
93. 868 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
94. Id. at 859.
95. Id at 859-60.
96. Id.
97. Id at 860.
98. Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 860.
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gether allowed the court to determine that both the group and the hospi-
tal could be considered joint employers for any member of the group.99
B. EMPLOYEE LEASING
Legislation passed in 1993 requires the licensing and regulation of enti-
ties that engage in staff leasing.100 This legislation permits a degree of
dual control over the leased employee between the leasing company,
often referred to as the "licensee," and the individual or entity which
utilizes the benefit of the employee, often referred to as the "client."''1
This is of particular significance in the health care field since many of
these "employees" hold a license that requires some supervision by the
client. Application of this arrangement could involve physicians em-
ployed by a non-profit health corporation, 0 2 physician assistants em-
ployed by someone other than a physician, 10 3 or nursing or administrative
staff provided to a physician's office by another entity such as a hospital.
The licensee retains such rights as hiring, firing, disciplining, reassign-
ment, employment, and safety policies. 1°4 For many purposes the dual
control permits the client to retain supervision over the employee for
those matters that relate to the employee's professional licensure.
There are, however, some areas of overlap that could be problematic.
As an example, a physician assistant is supervised by a physician in the
provision of health care services. When those services involve matters
related to OSHA Bloodborne Pathogen Standards, the licensee's right to
control safety policies could permit it to exercise control.10 5
C. EMPLOYMENT OF LICENSED INDIVIDUALS
1. Employment of Physician Assistants
Legislation passed in 1993 created a separate licensing authority for
physician assistants who were previously only authorized to act by the
Medical Practice Act.' 06 This new legislation does not restrict who may
serve as an employer of a physician assistant - employers of physician
assistants had previously been limited only to physicians.' 07 There is the
requirement, however, that if an individual or entity such as a health care
facility employs a physician assistant, an arrangement must be made in
which the physician assistant has a supervising physician.10
8
99. Id.
100. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 9104 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
101. Id.
102. See also supra Part III.B.
103. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b-1 (Vernon Supp. 1995); see also infra Part
IV.C.
104. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 9104 § 7(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
105. Barton, supra note 3, at 44.
106. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b-1 (Vernon Supp. 1995); see also infra Part
XIII.B.3.
107. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1995); see also infra Part XIII.B.3.
108. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 14 (Vernon Supp. 1995); see also infra part XIII.B.3.
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2. Employment of Physicians
Legislation passed in 1993 permits a non-profit hospital or clinic or an
organization that provides care to indigents to contract with a physician
for medical services.'0 9 The entity may guarantee a salary to the physi-
cian, bill, collect, and retain the collections up to the amount of the salary
and a reasonable amount related to collection services. 1 0
D. EMPLOYMENT RELATED LIABILITIES
Facilities that employ mental health, chemical dependency, or rehabili-
tative care workers have a duty to inquire about the past history of any
individual in their employment or being considered for employment re-
garding the individual's conduct that might be illegal, unprofessional, or
unethical and that relates to the operation of the facility."' Specific lia-
bility is imposed in the area of sexual exploitation both for an employer's
failure to inquire or for a former employer's failure to disclose informa-
tion about a former employee's conduct. 1 2 The information to be dis-
closed may date as far back as five years from the occurrence of the
sexual exploitation."13
VII. FRAUD & ABUSE
A. GENERAL
Legislation first enacted in 1991 dealt with the issue of the flow of ben-
efits to or from a provider of health care services to another who was in a
position to influence the referral of patients needing services. 14 Com-
monly referred to as the "Illegal Remuneration Statute," 1 5 it was the
basis for a wide sweeping investigation of psychiatric facilities by state
and federal agents. The results of these investigations intensified interest
in the area and yielded a number of amendments to this statute and to
other sections of the Health and Safety Code (Code) involving operation
of mental health, chemical dependency, and rehabilitation service facili-
ties. The subsections that follow will address changes and new additions
to the Code and a summary of the litigation involving the Texas Attorney
General and various providers.
1. Amendments to the Illegal Remuneration Statute
The 1993 amendments" 6 expanded the scope of coverage of the Act by
defining a "person" as anyone who pays or accepts a benefit from a per-
109. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 3.06(g)-(h) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
110. Id.
111. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 162.131-.132 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
112. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REm. CODE ANN. § 81.002 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
113. Id §§ 81.001-.009.
114. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.091 (Vernon 1992).
115. Id.
116. Id. §§ 161.091-.094 (Illegal Remuneration).
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son licensed by a health care agency. 117 It also created a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a violation had occurred if: (1) a person had referred or
accepted a referral of a person to an inpatient mental health or chemical
dependency treatment facility, (2) a payment for outpatient services after
discharge of the patient was made to the person making the referral, and
(3) the payment was not returned if the services were not provided. 118
The amendments also created an exemption for entities that qualified
as a health care information service. 119 The fifteen-part test requires vari-
ous disclosures including any relationship between the health care infor-
mation service and a health care provider or facility. 120
B. MENTAL HEALTH, CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY
AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES
1. Legislation
In addition to the illegal remuneration legislative amendments cited
above that apply to all regulated providers, specific legislation was passed
that applies primarily to mental health, chemical dependency, and reha-
bilitative care providers.
The Treatment Facilities Marketing Practices Act 121 describes certain
business practices involved in marketing that are considered violations of
the Code. These prohibited practices include the following: 122
1. compensation based upon volume of patient referrals;
117. Id. § 161.091(a).
118. Id. § 161.091(b) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
119. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.0915 (Vernon Supp. 1995). The 15-
part test involves numerous specific requirements for a health care information service(Service) to qualify for exemption. The Service must be offered by telephone without
charge to the person calling. The Service may not initiate calls to prospective consumers
and must not be influenced by a health care provider to direct consumers to any particular
provider. The Service is to provide information about possible health care providers based
upon certain criteria such as location, specialization, costs, payment arrangements among
other criteria. The names of providers must be given on a non-discriminatory basis. The
criteria and any questions the Service may ask the caller can not be accomplished in a
manner that directs the consumer to a particular provider. The Service must identify all
providers that meet the criteria specified by the caller in the geographic area indicated.
The Service must disclose any relationship between it and any health care providers. The
Service must maintain a customer service system that handles complaints and that
monitors customer satisfaction. The Service is prohibited from (1) offering health care
counseling services, (2) providing transportation to or from a provider's office, (3) advertis-
ing only for specific health care problems or health care providers, (4) charging health care
providers a fee based upon the volume or value of referrals made from the Service to the
provider, (5) excluding any provider from participation in its Service based upon the pro-
vider's specialty, (6) excluding a participant for any reason other than the participant's
ability to maintain licensure, malpractice insurance, documented consumer dissatisfaction
with the provider, adverse determinations of a peer review committee relating to the pro-
vider's professional or ethical conduct or termination of the agreement between provider
and the Service, and (7) disclosing information identifying a consumer unless the consumer
has authorized its release or the release is made in connection with an appointment with a
health care provider.
120. Id.
121. Id. §§ 164.001-.014.
122. Id. § 164.006.
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2. solicitation of patients by a referral source without disclosing the
existence of a relationship with a treatment facility, if any exists;
3. the placement of an individual from a treatment facility in a public
or private school or'a state or local governmental entity if that
individual is in a position to refer to the treatment facility (subject
to specific permitted practices);
4. contracts for the referral of patients between a treatment facility
and an intervention and assessment service unless that service is
operated by the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation, a county or regional medical society, a qualified
mental health referral service (as defined in this section of the
Code), or a non-profit organization involved with family violence,
runaway children, or rape;
5. operation of an intervention and assessment service by a treat-
ment facility unless the service discloses to each person contacting
the service of the relationship; and
6. advertisements that directly or indirectly promise a cure or guar-
antee treatment results including unsubstantiated claims.
For notes on the Illegal Remuneration Statute, see Part VII.A. above
regarding the rebuttable presumption created when payments for refer-
rals are made in connection with inpatient mental health services.123
2. Litigation
Armed with legislation passed in 1993, the Attorney General vigor-
ously pursued business practices in the psychiatric health service field
state-wide. Suits were filed against health care providers, marketing
firms, and management companies, with most resulting in settlements
with the state and agreements to discontinue the particular practices.
Most of the practices that were challenged involved payments from a pro-
vider either directly to a referral source or indirectly to a subcontractor
who in turn made such payments. These practices were clear violations of
the Illegal Remuneration Statute.124 Other practices that were chal-
lenged involved compensation arrangements, typically between a hospital
and a company that operated or managed a mental health unit for the
hospital, in which the amount paid was based upon the number of pa-
tients or patient days. Although there is disagreement in the legal com-
munity whether payment practices based upon the number of patients or
patient days violates the Illegal Remuneration Statute, 25 the defendant
providers have most often settled with the state rather than litigate the
issue.
123. Id. §§ 161.091-.094.
124. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.091(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
125. Health Law Section Meeting, State Bar of Texas Annual Convention, June 24,




In Texas v. BHC Richland Hospital Inc.,126 the hospital was charged
with several violations related to marketing and referral practices. The
Attorney General alleged that the hospital had hired a high school coun-
selor to make referrals to the hospital in direct violation of the solicita-
tion section of the Treatment Facilities Marketing and Admission
Practices Act (Act). 127 The suit also contended that the management
contract between the hospital and a firm hired to manage the hospital's
psychiatric unit illegally compensated the firm based upon the number of
patients maintained in the unit. 128 A further allegation claimed that the
hospital's failure to disclose the marketing relationship misled patients in
violation of the Act.129 Although the settlement agreement did not con-
tain any admission of wrongdoing by the hospital it did agree not to pay
remuneration for securing referrals and to contract only with licensed
mental health professionals. 130 Each of these requirements follow the il-
legal remuneration provisions of the Health and Safety Code.
131
In Texas v. Greeson132 the Attorney General alleged that Greeson's
marketing practices, which secured patients for Heights Hospital, did not
meet the requirements for operating a qualified mental health referral
service. 133 The marketing scheme, which did not utilize a psychiatric
evaluation, involved a toll-free telephone number that persons interested
in weight control could call. The marketing interviewer would determine
the person's insurance coverage and recommend inpatient hospitalization
for their weight condition. The outcome of this litigation was not settled
at the time of publication of this Article.
In Texas v. Texas Hotline, Inc. 134 and Texas v. Columbia Hospital Corp.
of Houston,135 similar allegations of making payments for the securing of
patients was the basis for the Attorney General's suits. The Columbia
suit was settled with agreement to revise admission policies, advertising
practices, and discontinue operation of assessment and referral services.
VIII. DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING PAYORS
OF HEALTH CARE
A. PROVIDER "DESELECrION"
The payment of health care most often involves an insurance company,
health maintenance organization (HMO), preferred provider organiza-
126. No. 93-14941 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Dec. 7, 1993) (order of dismis-
sal and nonsuit signed on Mar. 3, 1994).
127. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.006 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
128. Id.
129. Id. §§ 164.001-.014.
130. See 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 306 (1994).
131. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 161.091-.094 (Vernon Supp. 1995)
132. No. 94-02411 (345th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Mar. 2, 1994) (final judgment
May 20, 1994).
133. Id. (referring to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.007 (Vernon Supp.
1995)).
134. No. 94-02408 (261st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Mar. 2, 1994) (pending).
135. No. 94-02407 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Mar. 3, 1994).
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tion (PPO), or some other network arrangement that includes payors and
providers. These relations frequently are based upon some form of par-
ticipation agreement between the payor and provider. These participa-
tion agreements may be with individual providers, groups of providers, or
with organizations comprised of different types of providers (physician-
hospital organizations (PHO). Because of the efficiencies of contracting
with a number of providers, payors have increasingly turned to these
groups for participation agreements. The agreements and membership in
these groups are becoming a greater percentage of a provider's access to
patients and revenue. These agreements and membership in the various
organizations noted above do not, as a general rule, have elaborate "due
process" protections for the providers in the event the provider is termi-
nated ("deselected") or excluded from participation. Many of the agree-
ments have "without cause" termination provisions that are exercisable
by either party on relatively short notice. The cases discussed below rep-
resent initial efforts on the part of providers to develop some degree of
legal precedent requiring due process.
In Texas Medical Association v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,136 the Medi-
cal Association was representing members of its organization who had
been "deselected" from a preferred provider panel. The Association ar-
gued that the deselection threatened quality and continuity of care for the
patients served by these doctors. 137 The notices that Aetna sent to the
doctors indicated that the decision was based on business considerations
and did not reflect on the quality of care the doctors provided. The suit
was eventually dismissed by the court. 138
A similar suit was filed in Texas Medical Association v. Prudential,139
which involved deselection of doctors in a preferred provider panel. In
addition to the quality of care arguments made by the plaintiffs in
Aetna, 40 the plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to due process
rights under the Texas Administrative Code, which required a showing of
the evidence used for deselection, and opportunity to refute the evidence
and to present their own. Prudential indicated that the decision was an
exercise of "business judgment" and relied on the "without cause" termi-
nation provision of the agreement. The case has been removed to federal
court and is pending.
B. POLICY COVERAGE "MISREPRESENTATION"
In Texas v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Texas,' 41 the Attorney
General contended that Kaiser had misrepresented the coverage to be
136. No. Civ. A.H.-94-0288, 1994 WL 65477 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
137. 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 36 (Sept. 15, 1994).
138. Id.
139. No. 93-65003 (80th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex., Dec. 22, 1993) (removed to fed-
eral court on Dec. 29, 1993).
140. See supra note 137.
141. No. 94-08005 (98th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., June 30, 1994) (notice of re-
moval was filed Aug. 1, 1994).
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provided under health insurance policies. Kaiser had allegedly denied to
policy holders that their policies covered emergency care when the policy
provisions did cover such care. The suit also claimed that Kaiser practices
"unreasonably denied coverage or unreasonably delayed payment" on
emergency care claims.
Kaiser responded that the group of claims that were the basis of the
suit involved situations where the care received by the insureds was not
covered by the insurance policy. In this instance which is common to
HMO coverage, the plan does not pay for care rendered by a provider
who is not part of the Kaiser network or which had not been pre-ap-
proved, unless a bona fide emergency existed; Kaiser contended that the
suit was based upon a group of claims in which the primary issue was
whether or not an emergency condition existed.
C. INSURANCE FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL EMPLOYERS
The 1993 Legislature enacted the Small Employer Health Insurance
Availability Act, which provided for the development of health benefits
plans for employers with three to fifty employees. 142 Three types of plans
were authorized: (1) preventive and primary care which includes outpa-
tient and limited inpatient care, (2) inpatient hospital coverage and lim-
ited outpatient coverage, and (3) standard benefits providing a range of
services. 143 Employer requirements specify that seventy-five percent of
the premium cost be paid by the employer and that at least ninety percent
of the employees chose to be covered. 44 Insurance company require-
ments specify that small employers cannot be denied coverage due to
claim experience, health status, or medical history. 145 The insurer also is
limited in its ability to increase rates or adjust rates depending on the
type of employer. 146 The legislation also provides for the formation of
purchasing co-operatives, 147 requires that all health insurers utilize a uni-
form claim billing form, and requires that applications and policies be
written in plain language. 148
D. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITALS PROHIBITED
New provisions of the Insurance Code require that an HMO or a PPO
permit an osteopathic hospital the opportunity to contract for services if
it serves the area covered by the HMO and PPO and the cost for services
is similar to other hospital providers. 149
142. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 26.01-.76 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
143. Id. arts. 26.02(23) & 26.42-.50.
144. Id art. 26.21(b).
145. Id. art. 26.72.
146. Id arts. 26.31-.36.
147. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 26.11-.16 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
148. Id. art. 26.43.





A provider's duty to render emergency health care is governed by sev-
eral considerations. In the case of a licensed professional such as a physi-
cian, a duty exists if there is an existing patient-physician relationship. If
no relationship exists, the physician may choose to enter into one on a
"charity" basis as described below in the subsection dealing with the
"Good Samaritan law"'150 or the usual form noted above. If the physician
elects to participate on a hospital's emergency "on-call" list then the phy-
sician has, in essence, agreed to enter into a patient-physician relationship
with those individuals who present to a hospital emergency depart-
ment.' 5 ' The type of relationship the physician or any other licensed pro-
fessional chooses to pursue dictates what duties will be expected of the
provider. The cases below represent recent interpretations of some of
these duties.
In Pope v. St. John'52 a physician who was on call at a hospital was held
to have assumed a legal duty to exercise ordinary care in the diagnosis of
a patient who had presented at the hospital's emergency room.153 The
physician had responded to a call from the emergency room physician
and attempted to diagnose on the basis of information supplied over the
telephone. 154 In remanding to the trial court, the appeals court was per-
suaded that fact issues existed regarding whether appropriate testing had
not been part of the diagnosis.15
5
In Hernandez v. Lukefahr 5 6 a physician was permitted to utilize the
"Good Samaritan" statute 5 7 as a defense.' 58 The physician had re-
sponded to an emergency call for help while on the hospital premises.
59
The physician went to the emergency room to assist with a patient being
resuscitated. 60 After no apparent success, the physician pronounced the
patient dead.' 61 The patient subsequently showed some signs of life and
was transferred to another hospital but died within a few days.' 62 The
court determined that the physician fit within the requirements of the
statute in that he (1) did not routinely provide care in the emergency
room, (2) he did not expect to receive any compensation for the services
150. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.001-.002 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995)
151. 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086 (1994).
152. 862 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted).
153. Id. at 661.
154. Id at 659.
155. Id at 661.
156. 879 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
157. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.001-.002 (Vernon 1986 & Supp 1995).
158. Id. at 144.
159. Id at 139.
160. Id
161. Id at 139.
162. Id at 139-40.
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provided, and (3) he was not shown to have been grossly negligent in his
actions.163
Another item of note is the "Good Samaritan" statute' 64 which was
enacted to encourage both medical and non-medical persons to render
aid in a medical emergency. The standard of care is lowered to relieve
some degree of liability for the actions of a "Good Samaritan.' 65 The
statute can be asserted as a defense if the individual rendering the aid
does not receive compensation for the services rendered and has not ac-
ted with wanton or willful negligence. 166
Recent amendments clarify that the statute does not apply to certain
individuals in the following circumstances: 67 (1) to the patient's admit-
ting, attending, or treating physician, (2) to those personnel who routinely
work in a hospital emergency room unless the person is in the emergency
room area for reasons wholly unrelated to work (3) to those who would
ordinarily be compensated for the care given in the particular situation,
and (4) to a person whose negligent act or omission was a producing
cause of the event.
B. HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIAN ACTS
In Berel v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc.168 a summary judgment
for the hospital was reversed holding that the hospital could be held lia-
ble for the acts of a staff member's practice of medicine. 69 Acknowledg-
ing the body of case law holding that a hospital was not responsible for
the acts of a physician under a master-servant theory the court decided
that the nature of the right to control the details of the work of the physi-
cian could serve as such a basis.' 70
The court found persuasive deposition testimony by the physician in-
volved that control was exercised in the course of the hospital's quality
assurance and utilization review committee activities.17' According to
the physician these committees and the hospital's medical director could
override a physician's medical orders. 172 The court also examined lan-
guage in the Mental Health Code 173 that requires a mental hospital to be
"run by" a qualified physician who is held responsible for performing cer-
tain duties.' 74 The court viewed these statutory requirements as forming
163. 879 S.W.2d 140-41.
164. See supra note 157.
165. 879 S.W.2d at 141.
166. See supra note 157.
167. See id.
168. 881 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.-Houston[lst Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
169. Id. at 23-24.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 24-25.
172. Id. at 24.
173. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 571.001, .007, 576.021-.022, 577.008
(Vernon 1992)(Texas Mental Health Code).
174. Id. at 25.
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the basis for a nondelegable duty upon the hospital. 175 The deposition
testimony and the statutory language, taken together, led the court to
hold that there were fact issues to be considered at the trial court regard-
ing the degree of control that would justify imposing liability on the
hospital.176
This case and any subsequent litigation that relies on Berel as prece-
dent may represent an opportunity for plaintiffs to expand the ways in
which a hospital could be held responsible for acts of a physician. The
Texas Mental Health Code 177 imposes various duties upon a hospital with
respect to its medical staff but permits a delegation of those duties to
medical staff units of self-governance. 178 Whether these delegated func-
tions will serve as the basis for imputing control by a hospital over a phy-
sician may serve to reshape these self-governance functions. Plaintiffs
may be afforded an expanded basis for claims if this becomes a trend.
Hospitals likewise should monitor whether a trend begins with this case
to react in an appropriate manner regarding these physician self-govern-
ance functions.
The issue of negligent credentialing was the principal cause of action in
Lopez v. Central Plains Regional Hospital,179 that was reversed on ap-
peal. The appeals court affirmed most of the summary judgment issues in
favor of the hospital in the related malpractice claim but found that fact
issues remained regarding the negligent credentialing claim.180
There was conflicting evidence presented regarding the thoroughness
of the assessment by both sides regarding the competency of the physi-
cian in question.' 8 ' In assessing the physician's capabilities in obstetrics
the hospital had followed its policies closely, however, the appeals court
believed that the evidence regarding the thoroughness of the assessment
was subject to various interpretations. 8 2 Although the hospital creden-
tialing process did include obtaining letters of recommendation and eval-
uations from individuals who had worked with and supervised the
applicant there remained the question whether the information allowed
for a determination of "actual clinical competency.' 8 3 The information
reviewed did not address this specific issue and did not appear to ask
those responding to evaluation requests about competence in the area of
obstetrics. 184 This case not only reinforces negligent credentialing as a
recognized cause of action but indicates an increasing degree of scrutiny




177. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 571.001 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995).
178. Id.
179. 859 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
180. Id. at 607.
181. Id. at 603-04.
182. Id. at 603.
183. Id.
184. Lopez, 859 S.W.2d at 603.
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C. LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
1. Application of Texas Torts Claim Act
In University of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 185 the court
held that a patient's medical record is not tangible personal property. 186
This determination allows the medical branch to meet the requirements
of the Texas Torts Claim Act' 87 which requires that "a condition or use of
tangible personal or real property"' 88 be involved before a governmental
entity can be held liable.
York's malpractice claim against the medical branch was based on al-
leged failure of hospital personnel to record information on the medical
record that would have indicated the need for treatment.189 In reversing
an appeals court's affirmation of a trial court's finding of negligence, the
Supreme Court of Texas held that while the paper of the medical record
itself was tangible the information to be recorded was intangible. 19° The
court further determined that there was no clear indication that the Leg-
islature intended to impose governmental liability for the misuse of
information. 19'
2. HMO Not a "Provider" of Health Care
In Pickett v. CIGNA Healthplan of Texas,' 92 the appeals court upheld
precedent that an HMO is not liable for the acts of a physician providing
care if the HMO did not directly employ, supervise, or contract with the
physician. 93 The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against
CIGNA claiming that it was liable for the negligence of the treating phy-
sicians as its agents and that CIGNA had "held itself out" as a practi-
tioner of medicine. The treating physicians were employees of a medical
group that had an agreement with CIGNA. Since the physicians were
under the control of that group and not CIGNA, the court determined
that there was not a sufficient degree of supervision to consider the indi-
vidual physicians as agents of CIGNA. 194
The court also analyzed the claim in view of the Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act of Texas 195 (commonly referred to as the
"Malpractice Statute") and determined that the statute did not apply to a
health maintenance organization 196 since it did not meet the statutory
185. 871 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1994).
186. Id. at 178-79.
187. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986).
188. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1986).
189. York, 871 S.W.2d at 176.
190. Id. at 178-79.
191. Id at 179.
192. 1993 WL 209858 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (not desig-
nated for publication).
193. Id. at *3.
194. Id.
195. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i §§ 1.01-15.01 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas).
196. Pickett, 1993 WL 209858 at 2-3.
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definition of a physician or a "health care provider" which includes "any
person, partnership, professional association, corporation, facility, or in-
stitution duly licensed or chartered by the State of Texas to provide
health care .. .or an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the
course and scope of his employment."'1 97
X. MEDICAL RECORDS
A. CONFIDENTIALITY
The Fifth Circuit in Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hospital Foundation,
Inc. 98 upheld the preemption of state law' 99 which protects medical
records from discovery medical records.2°° The release was required in
connection with a federal civil service hearing involving a civil servant
whose employment had been terminated. The court sought the medical
records of the wife and son of the former employee who had allegedly
attempted to murder both. The wife and son sought an injunction en-
joining the production of the records. Even though a state court had en-
tered a permanent injunction barring release of the medical records, 20'
the proceeding was removed to federal court which determined that (1)
the need for the medical records was pursuant to an authorized and
proper investigation and (2) the documents sought were relevant to the
investigation.202
B. TIME REQUIREMENTS
Amendments to the Medical Practice Act require that a physician must
release the medical records within thirty days of an appropriately author-
ized request.203 Previous law remained intact which permits the physi-
cian to delete any part of the medical record that the physician believes
would be harmful to the physical, mental, or emotional health of the pa-
tient.204 The amendments require that the physician state the reasons for
not releasing the information. 20 5 This confidentiality provision also al-
lows the physician to delete confidential information about another per-
son that may exist in the medical record.20 6 The amendments also
expanded the manner in which summaries of medical records can be pre-
pared including microfilm, computer means, or optical scanning devices.
197. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i § 1.03(a)(3).
198. 5 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 1993).
199. Id. at 791.
200. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b § 5.08 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (Medical Prac-
tice Act).
201. 5 F.3d at 788.
202. Id. at 790-91.
203. TEX. REV. Ov. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b §§ 5.08(d),(k), (n) (Vernon Supp. 1995).





C. HOSPITAL NOT REQUIRED TO PAY FOR COPY COSTS
In Wiggs v. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hospital,20 7 the appeals court up-
held the trial court's finding that a hospital was not responsible to bear
the cost of copying a patient's medical record. The plaintiff, who was
preparing to file a medical malpractice claim, brought a declaratory ac-
tion against the hospital seeking production of the records without pay-
ment. The trial court ruled that the provisions of the Medical Liability
and Insurance Improvement Act 20 8 were unambiguous and did not im-
pose responsibility for costs of duplicating the records on the hospital.
XI. PATIENT'S RIGHTS
A. RIGHT TO TREATMENT
Although In the Matter of Baby "K"209 is merely persuasive authority,
it may provide guidance for any hospital or other provider facing the is-
sue of whether to provide treatment that it considers "futile." In this
case, an infant was born with anencephaly, a congenital defect in which
the cerebral cortex is absent or underdeveloped. 210 No treatment exists
to cure, correct, or ameliorate the defect.211
The hospital sought to discontinue treatment over the mother's objec-
tions contending that any treatment would be futile. The court found that
the infant enjoyed protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA),212 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act),213
and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTLA). 214
In the ADA analysis, the court reasoned that Section 302(a) prohibits a
public accommodation, including a hospital, from discriminating against
an individual with a disability.215 The discrimination was the denial of the
use of a ventilator for the anencephalic infant where other infants need-
ing a ventilator would have been provided that service.216 The court rea-
soned that the hospital's rationale would lead to discrimination against an
entire class of disabled individuals (i.e., anencephalic babies). 217 On a
similar basis, the court's application of the Rehabilitation Act determined
that, if Baby K were "otherwise qualified" to receive the use of a ventila-
tor other than for the fact of the anencephaly, then withholding ventilator
207. No. 048-153-895-94 (48th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex., May 25, 1994) (pending).
208, TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i § 4.01 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
209, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 91 (1994).
210. 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
211. Id.
212. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993).
213. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
214. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988).
215. 832 F.Supp. at 1028-29.




treatment from Baby K without parental consent would violate the
Act.218
Finally, the EMTLA requires that a hospital provide for "stabilizing"
treatment which, in the case of Baby K, would include providing a venti-
lator.219 The court rejected the hospital's contention that an exemption
should apply since the stabilizing treatment would be futile and inhu-
mane.220 This case represents one example of the many dilemmas facing
health care providers, especially hospitals, in dealing with the issue of
allocating limited resources.
B. MENTAL HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS
1. Patient Confidentiality
Legislation passed by the 1993 Legislature amending the Health and
Safety Code creates a limited exception to the restriction on the release
of medical record information from a mental health facility.221 Unless a
patient gives their attending physician contrary written instructions, 222 a
treating physician may disclose the fact that the patient was, is, or is plan-
ning to be treated in a mental health facility.223 The disclosure may only
be made if it is believed to be in the patient's best interest and only to a
law enforcement officer or the patient's legally authorized representa-
tive.224 A legally authorized representative includes a parent or legal
guardian, an agent under a durable power of attorney for health care, an
attorney ad litem, or for a deceased patient a parent, spouse, adult, child,
or personal representative. 225
2. Patient Bill of Rights
That part of the Health and Safety Code dealing with mental health
services was expanded by the Legislature to require that a "patient's bill
of rights" be developed for use in facilities to protect the health, safety,
and rights of a patient receiving voluntary or involuntary mental health,
chemical dependency, or comprehensive medical rehabilitation services
in an inpatient facility.226
A separate "Bill of Rights" was developed for adults, teenagers, and
children.227 The adult version is the most elaborately written and in-
cludes specific freedoms that relate to the environment in which the care
218. Id at 1028-29.
219. 832 F. Supp. at 1026-27.
220. Id. at 1027.
221. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 576.005 (Vernon 1995).
222. Id. § 576.005(c).
223. See id.
224. Id. § 576.005(b).
225. Id § 576.005(d).
226. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 321.001-.004 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
227. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 404.162 (West 1994).
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is provided.228 In addition to basic constitutional rights, adults are as-
sured that: (1) treatment will be provided in the least restrictive setting,
(2) any limitation of their rights will be reviewed at least every seven
days, (3) communication privacy is maintained, (4) visitation access is not
restrictive, (5) limitation on access to outdoors will be reviewed at least
every three days, (6) unnecessary searches will not be conducted, (7) the
patient's access to their own medical records is available subject to medi-
cally necessary limitations, (8) the right to refuse treatment, including
medication, is clear, (9) a treatment plan is developed, and (10) physical
restraints must be specifically ordered by a physician.229 For voluntarily
admitted patients there is the right to leave the facility at any time unless
a physician believes that emergency detention or court ordered services
are necessary or if the patient is under the age of sixteen and the parent
or guardian who agreed to the admission objects to the patient leaving.230
The teenager's version includes most of the same basic rights as in the
adult version although in a much more abbreviated manner.231 This ver-
sion encourages communication with friends and family, requires that the
patient be informed if any special observation is required, and requires
explanation if physical restraint is used including the reason such restraint
is required and when and why it will be removed.232
The children's version, "The Little Dinosaur Named Wilbur" is
presented in coloring book format with large, easy to read text.233 It is
designed to assure the child that he or she will have access to their games
and toys, be able to play with other children, visit with friends and family,
be able to call or write letters, and have the treating staff explain treat-
ments and the plan of care. 234 Supplementary materials to this version
encourage the child to report things they do not like about the hospital to
the hospital and their family.
3. Other Rights for In-patient Mental Health Services
The Health and Safety Code was amended at several provisions sub-
stantially expanding rights and protections to patients receiving in-patient
mental health services. Among these expanded rights and protections
are:
A. rights to information on medications235 including identification of
the drugs prescribed, conditions the medications are commonly
228. Id. at Exhibit A (four-page pamphlet entitled "Patient's Bill of Rights," published
by and available from the Health Facility Licensure and Certification Division of the Texas
Department of Health, 1-800-228-1570) (copy on file with author).
229. Id. at 2-3.
230. Id. at 3.
231. Id at Exhibit B (two-page pamphlet entitled "Teen's Bill of Rights") (copy on file
with author).
232. Id at 2.
233. Id. at Exhibit C (pamphlet designed for children) (copy on file with author).
234. Id. at 5-17.
235. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.0415 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
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used to treat, beneficial effects of the medications, side effects
and risks, and sources of further information on the drugs;236
B. rights to communicate with a person outside the facility by tele-
phone and by uncensored and sealed mail and to have any limita-
tion on visitation and/or communication rights documented as to
the clinical reasons for the limitation and the duration;237
C. rights to a court hearing when a patient refuses an order for
psychoactive medications;238
D. access to a patient's own mental health record and an explana-
tion if a professional denies access to any portion of the rec-
ord 239 and
E. right to refuse treatment unless another individual has authority
to make treatment decisions and right to informed consent in-
cluding benefits, risks and alternatives to the treatment being
considered.240
XII. PEER REVIEW AND RELATED ISSUES
A. PRIVILEGE OF CONFIDENTIALITY FOR PEER REVIEW AND
MEDICAL COMMITTEES
TWo statutory provisions govern the privilege of confidentiality of peer
review proceedings. The Health and Safety Code as recently amended
provides that the records and proceedings of a "medical committee" are
confidential and not subject to court subpoena.241 This protection is con-
tingent upon the records and proceedings of the committee being used
only in the proper exercise of committee function and that these are not
records maintained in the ordinary course of business. 242 The other pro-
vision can be found in the Medical Practice Act 243 which provides that
"records or determinations of or communications to a medical peer re-
view committee are not subject to subpoena or discovery .... "244
These two provisions were compared in McAllen Methodist Hospital v.
Ramirez,245 in which a hospital sought to reverse a trial court's order re-
quiring the release of various physician credentialing file information. 246
The court noted that the Health and Safety Code (Code) provision was
narrower than the Medical Practice Act provision (MPA) since the MPA
applied to all information related to the peer review committee whereas
the Code provision related only to the records and proceedings.2 47
236. Id. § 571.0065.
237. l § 576.006.
238. Id. §§ 574.101-.109.
239. Id. § 611.0045.
240. Id. § 462.009.
241. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032(a) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995).
242. Id. § 161.032(b)-(c).
243. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b § 5.06(g), (h) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
244. Id. § 5.060).
245. 855 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
246. Id. at 197.
247. Id. at 197.
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The court, in deciding whether to apply the broader MPA protection or
the narrower Code provision, focused on the definition of a "medical
peer review committee; '248 in particular its described function "to evalu-
ate the quality of medical and health-care services or the competence of
physicians. '249 It also reviewed the definition of "medical peer re-
view"'250 and came to the conclusion that the privilege attaches to the
review of physicians in the course of their practice at the hospital where
the peer review committee functioned.251 "The evaluation and review
must relate to activities or occurrences at the hospital so that corrective
or preventative measures may be taken."252
With these distinctions drawn, the court applied the protective privi-
lege to peer review information for a physician already on staff but de-
clined the privilege to information received in the course of a physician
seeking membership to a hospital.253 Therefore the information con-
tained in letters of recommendation and evaluation forms completed by
those responding to requests for information should not expect the privi-
lege to apply.
B. PRIVILEGE FOR JCAHO REPORT
In Humana Hospital Corp. v. Spears-Petersen,254 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals determined that a hospital's Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) survey report could be
protected from discovery in a medical malpractice suit.255 It held that the
report was a product of a joint committee contemplated by the Health
and Safety Code,256 that the disclosure of information on a voluntary ba-
sis to JCAHO did not constitute a waiver of privilege, and that the re-
ports reflected a deliberative process of the organization with the purpose
of improving patient care.257
C. PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY SUSTAINED
In Maewal v. Adventist Health Systems,258 the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals upheld a trial court's summary judgment holding for a hospital and
its physician peer review participants who were involved in a disciplinary
action.259 In finding that the hospital and physicians qualified for the im-
munities afforded by the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
248. Id. at 198-99.
249. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b § 1.03(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
250. Id. § 1.03(a)(9).
251. 855 S.W.2d at 199.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 200.
254. 867 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ).
255. Id. at 861.
256. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.031 (a)(2) (Vernon 1992).
257. 867 S.W.2d at 862.
258. 868 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
259. Id. at 894.
1334 [Vol. 48
HEALTHCARE LAW
(HCQIA)260 and the Texas Medical Practice Act (MPA),261 the court de-
termined that the hospital and its peer review participants had acted with-
out malice and could be presumed to have met the requirements of
HCQIA and the MPA.262 Since the plaintiff presented no evidence to
rebut the presumption, the immunities were applied by the court without
a review of whether other requirements of HCQIA had been met.263
XIII. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PROFESSIONALLY
LICENSED INDIVIDUALS
A. GENERAL
The 1993 Legislature enacted the Health Professions Council Act264
which, among other requirements, imposed upon all individuals licensed
by a health licensing agency uniform rules governing advertising.265 "Ad-
vertising that is false, misleading, or deceptive or that is not readily sub-
ject to verification is declared unlawful .... ,,266 Advertising of this
nature will subject a licensed individual to revocation or denial of his or
her license and permits an action to be instituted by the consumer protec-
tion division of the Attorney General's office. 267
The particular advertising activities proscribed include:
1. Makes a material misrepresentation or omission;268
2. creation of unjustified expectations about results or
procedures; 269
3. comparison with other like professionals unless the comparison
can be substantiated;270
4. inclusion of testimonials;271
5. causes confusion or misunderstanding regarding the credentials,
education or licensure of a particular professional;272
6. offers to waive payment of deductibles or copayments;273
7. offers to accept insurance payment as payment "in full" regardless
of whether a policy contains deductible or copayment re-
quirements;274
8. claims that play upon the fears of susceptible persons; or
275
260. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1988 &
Supp. 1993).
261. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b § 5.06(b) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
262. 868 S.W.2d at 892-93.
263. Id. at 893-94.
264. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512p §§ 1-9 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (Health Profes-
sionals Council Act).
265. Id § 4.
266. Id. § 4(a).
267. Id.
268. TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512p § 4(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
269. Id. § 4(b)(2).
270. Id. § 4(b)(3).
271. Id. § 4(b)(4).
272. Id. § 4(b)(5).
273. Id. § 4(b)(6).
274. Id. § 4(b)(7).
275. Id. § 4(b)(8).
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9. use of a professional title or designation that is expressly or com-
monly used by another type of licensed individual.276
However, these activities neither create a private cause of action nor pro-
vide a basis for breach of warranty or implied contract for workman-like
service.277
B. PHYSICIANS AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS
1. Physician Requirements
Amendments to the Health and Safety Code that relate to the prescrip-
tion of controlled substances require (1) that the prescribing physician
indicate the intended use of the drug unless the physician believes it is not
in the best interest of the patient, (2) the name, address, and telephone
number of the physician's place of business, (3) the DEA registration
number of the physician, and (4) the quantity prescribed in both word
and numerical form.278
2. Complaint Procedures Related to Persons Licensed By the Texas
State Board of Medical Examiners
Persons regulated by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners
(SBME) which includes physicians, physician assistants and acupunc-
turists must meet requirements which enable patients to submit com-
plaints to the SBME.279 These requirements involve the placement of
notices in conspicuous places in the practitioners office, in the patient's
statement, or in the registration form completed by the patient.280 The
notice must inform patients how and where to make a complaint. It must
be written in English and Spanish.281
3. Regulation of Physician Assistants
The Physician Assistant Licensing Act (Act) 28 2 imposed new licensing
requirements for physician assistants and established the Physician Assis-
tant Advisory Council to advise the Texas State Board of Medical Exam-
iners and to regulate the profession including all matters related to
licenses. 283 In addition to the typical duties of a licensing board, the Act
delineated the scope of practice of a physician assistant to include:
1. obtaining patient histories and performing physical
examinations;284
2. ordering or performing diagnostic or therapeutic procedures;
285
276. Id. § 4(b)(9).
277. Id. § 4(c).
278. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.074(k) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
279. 19 Tex. Reg. 3328 (1994) (to be codified at 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 188.1)
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b-1 §§ 1-23 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
283. Id. §§ 4-5.
284. Id. § 12(b)(1).
285. Id. § 12(b)(2).
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3. formulating a working diagnosis; 286
4. developing and implementing a treatment plan;287
5. monitoring the effectiveness of therapeutic interventions; 288
6. assisting at surgery;289
7. offering counseling and education to patients;290
8. requesting, receiving and signing for professional samples and dis-
tributing them to patients at a site serving medically undeserved
populations, as defined by statute or rule;29 1 and
9. making appropriate referrals. 292
The Act permits the employment of physician assistants by entities other
than physicians293 but requires that the assistant be "supervised" by a
physician and that the supervising physician share legal responsibility
with the entity.294
C. NURSING
Amendments to the Professional Nurse Reporting Act295 include new
provisions that relate to the following:
A. reports required to be made must be written, signed, identify the
nurse, indicate what corrective action was taken and recommend
whether the Board of Nurse Examiners (Board) take formal dis-
ciplinary action;296 and
B. when an employer or contractor takes an action against a nurse
that involves reportable conduct and is effective for more than
seven days a report to the Board must be made.297
Amendments to the Peer Review Act298 change the composition of a
professional nursing peer review committee to include three-fourths of its
members as registered nurses, only permit registered nurses to vote, if
possible have at least one nurse in the practice field of the subject nurse,
afford at least minimum due process including notice of the hearing and
an opportunity for rebuttal.299
Additional statutes on specific areas were enacted in 1993 that relate to
professional review activities involving nurses governed by the Board:
A. penalties and sanctions;300
286. Id § 12(b)(3).
287. Id. § 12(b)(4).
288. Id. § 12(b)(5).
289. Id. § 12(b)(5).
290. Id. § 12(b)(7).
291. Id. § 12(b)(8).
292. Id. § 12(b)(9).
293. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 4495b-1 § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
294. Id § 17.




298. Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4525b §§ 1-7 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (Peer Review).
299. Id. § 1A.
300. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4525.1 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
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B. complaint and investigation; 30'
C. agreed disposition;30 2
D. rights of registered nurses;303
E. initiation of formal charges; 3°4 and
F. hearings.305
D. PHARMACY
Amendments to the Texas Pharmacy Act 30 6 include the following sig-
nificant changes:
1. Pharmacists may administer medication under certain circum-
stances (1) when a licensed health care provider authorized to administer
the medication is not available, (2) the failure to administer the medica-
tion could result in the interruption of a critical phase of drug therapy, (3)
the pharmacist possesses the skill and education required to administer
the medication, (4) the pharmacist notifies the health care provider re-
sponsible for the care of the patient, (5) the medication is not adminis-
tered in the patient's residence unless a licensed nursing home or
hospital, and (6) the pharmacist does not delegate this authority. 30 7
2. Pharmacists may refill a prescription (unless it is a Schedule II con-
trolled substance) without the authorization of the prescribing practi-
tioner in the following circumstances: 30 8
A. failure to refill the prescription might interrupt a therapeutic reg-
imen or create patient suffering; 30 9
B. either a disaster has occurred which prohibits the pharmacist
from contacting the practitioner, or the pharmacist is unable to
contact the practitioner after reasonable effort; 310
C. the quantity dispensed does not exceed a 72-hour supply;311
D. the patient is informed that the dispensing is without authoriza-
tion and that future refills will require authorization from the
practitioner; 312 and
E. the pharmacist informs the practitioner of the refill as soon as
reasonably possible. 313
301. Id. art. 4525.2.
302. Id. art. 4525.3.
303. Id. art. 4525.4.
304. Id. art. 4525.5.
305. Id. art. 4525.6.
306. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4542a-1 §§ 1-41 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (Texas Phar-
macy Act).
307. Id. § 17(a)(5)(A)-(F).
308. Id. § 40B.
309. Id. § 40B(1).
310. Id. § 40B(2)(A),(B).
311. Id. § 40B(3).
312. Id. § 40B(4).
313. Id. § 40B(5).
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A number of amendments in the Health and Safety Code (Code) relate
to the licensing of hospitals by the Texas Department of Health.3 14 These
amendments became effective on September 1, 1993. Those of greatest
general impact on the operations of hospitals are outlined below.
A. Emergency Orders.315 The Health Commissioner is authorized to
issue emergency orders against a hospital if the commissioner believes
that a hospital is violating or about to violate Code provisions, rules, spe-
cial license provisions, injunctions, or any other order of the Commis-
sioner or enforcement procedure. 316 The Commissioner must notify a
hospital prior to the issuance of such an order and afford the hospital an
opportunity for a hearing.3 17 The hearing must be held within 10 days of
the hospital's receipt of the notice. 318
B. Administrative Penalties.319 The Commissioner is authorized to as-
sess administrative penalties against a hospital for violations of Code pro-
visions, rules, special license provisions, Commissioner orders or
enforcement procedures.3 20 The penalties, which may be assessed up to
$1000 for each day the violation occurs,321 are subject to mitigating fac-
tors such as previous violations, seriousness of the violation, jeopardy to
patient health, safety, or rights, good faith conduct of the hospital, and
"other matters as justice may require. ' 322 Due process requirements in-
cluding the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act are incor-
porated in this penalty provision.323 The Commissioner is authorized to
penalize hospitals that do not adopt, implement, or enforce a patient
transfer policy in accordance with section 241.047 of the Code.324 Failure
to conform to requirements of sections 241.028 or 241.055 permit an ag-
grieved individual to seek injunctive relief.325
C. Patient Transfers. Amendments to the Code conformed licensing
requirements to existing federal law with respect to informed consent and
314. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 241.001-.123 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995)
(Hospitals).
315. Id. § 241.0531.
316. Id. § 41.0531(a).
317. Id.
318. Id. § 241.053(b).
319. Id. § 241.059.
320. Id. § 241.059(a).
321. Id. § 241.059(c).
322. Id § 241.059(b)(1)-(5).
323. Id § 241.059(d)-(r).
324. Id. § 241.055.
325. Id. § 241.056.
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informed refusal of treatment.326 In particular the revisions require
adoption of rules327 on the following:
(1) written request from the patient or representative seeking a
transfer;328
(2) certification by a physician or qualified medical person in the
physician's absence indicating the risks and benefits of the
transfer;329
(3) all reasonable steps must be taken by a hospital to obtain the
informed refusal of treatment or transfer in the event the patient
refuses such;330 and
(4) acknowledgement of any contractual, statutory, or regulatory
obligation that exists between a patient and a designated or man-
dated provider for the transfer of emergency or nonemergency
patients.331
D. Standards and Issuance of Annual Licenses. Code amendments332
require the adoption of rules that attempt to achieve consistency between
Medicare Conditions of Participation 333 and standards of the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). This
same section also eliminated prior Code 334 language that prohibited the
adoption of minimum standards exceeding Medicare Conditions of Par-
ticipation. Other Code amendments permit the issuance of an annual li-
cense without an annual inspection if the hospital is certified as meeting
Medicare Conditions of Participation or is accredited by the JCAHO.335
E. Inspections. The Texas Department of Health is allowed to inspect
or investigate, at any reasonable time, a facility, its books, records, and
documents as it determines necessary to enforce the Code, and related
requirements. 336 The information that is obtained in connection with any
such inspection or investigation must be maintained in a confidential
manner by the Texas Department of Health.337
2. Comprehensive Medical Rehabilitation Services
Legislation passed in 1993 provided for the licensure and adoption of
standards related to the provision of comprehensive rehabilitative serv-
ices provided by someone other than an individual.338 The specific serv-
326. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.027 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995).
327. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 133.101-102; see also infra Part XIV.B. for a discussion
of federal patient transfer rules.
328. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.027(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
329. Id. § 241.027(c)(2), (3).
330. Id. § 241.027(e).
331. Id. § 241.027(f).
332. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.026 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995).
333. 42 U.S.C. §8 1395-1395ccc (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
334. Act of June 13, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S. ch. 584, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Sec, 4(b)
(Vernon) (codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.026).
335. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE Arm. § 222.024 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
336. Id. § 241.051 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995).
337. Id. § 241.051(a).




ices to be governed by these provisions involve those that are "designed
to improve or minimize a person's physical or cognitive disabilities, maxi-
mize a person's functional ability, or restore a person's lost functional
capacity .. . ,,339 A license is required if the services to be provided
involve the supervision of a physician and are more intensive than nurs-
ing facility care and minor treatment. 340
The legislation imposed the adoption of standards for the provision of
rehabilitation services that include the following:341
A. a facility must have a medical director who is a licensed physician
board certified or eligible for certification in a specialty related to
rehabilitation; 342
B. medical supervision by a licensed physician must be available 24
hours each day;343
C. therapy to be provided by a multispecialty team that has at least
eleven specified capabilities; 3"4 and
D. written treatment and continuing care plans must be developed
by these multispecialty teams and provided to the patient and
any designated representative. 345
3. Home Health and Hospice Care
Legislation relating to home health and hospice care amended various
provisions of the Code.34 6 These amendments consolidate for licensing
purposes home health services, hospice care, and personal care into a sin-
gle license for a "home and community support services agency" li-
cense. 347 The Texas Department of Health (TDH) is permitted to deem
licensing for entities that meet accreditation requirements of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the Commu-
nity Health Accreditation Program, or certified by a state agency whose
standards meet or exceed requirements for licensing.348
Exemptions from licensing for these services include the following:349
A. individual licensed professionals providing care in an institutional
setting such as physicians, nurses, and dentists, among others;
B. individuals providing services through a contract to a licensed
entity;
C. licensed entities that provide these services to their inpatients or
residents;
339. Id. § 241.121.
340. Id. § 241.122.
341. Id. § 241.123.
342. Id. § 241.123(b)(1).
343. Id. § 241(b)(2).
344. Id. § 241.123(c).
345. Id § 241.123(d)-(f).
346. TEX. HEALTh & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 142.001-.030 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995)
(Home and Community Support Services).
347. Id. § 142.002.
348. Id § 142.006(c), (d).
349. Id. § 142.003.
1995] 1341
SMU LAW REVIEW
D. individuals providing services pursuant to the Texas Workers
Compensation Act; and
E. individuals hired directly by the client or their family.
TDH investigations of any agency licensed under this section are confi-
dential and may only be released to a state or federal agency or law en-
forcement personnel, by authorized consent of patients involved, if
required by law, or if in a form developed by TDH that does not identify
specific individuals.350
B. PATIENT TRANSFER REGULATIONS
Regulations351 implementing the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act were published as interim rules on June 22, 1994 and
became effective on July 22, 1994.352 These regulations describe the re-
sponsibilities of hospitals and their staff to provide medical screening to
individuals presenting at a hospital's emergency department, to stabilize
their condition, and to transfer to another facility in an appropriate man-
ner when necessary. Important aspects of the regulations including re-
cent interpretations are outlined below.
1. Facilities Subject to Regulations353
The requirement to screen, treat, and transfer applies to hospitals that
offer emergency services. Those facilities that do not offer emergency
services must have procedures to deal with patients needing emergency
services if they present at such a facility.
2. When Services Must Be Rendered354
In efforts to clarify when the regulations apply to a person's need for
emergency medical care, this section defines that a person "comes to the
emergency department" when the person is on the hospital property.
Specifically excluded are patients in emergency medical transport vehi-
cles who have contacted the hospital but have not been accepted for
treatment unless the hospital owns or operates the transport vehicle
involved.
3. Medical Screening and PersonneP55
A medical screening must be performed on each individual who comes
to the emergency department to determine whether an emergency exists
and what treatment is necessary, if any, to stabilize the patient. The per-
350. Id. § 142.009(d).
351. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
352. 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086 (1994).
353. Provider Agreements under Medicare, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,120 (1994) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 489.20, 489.24(a)).
354. Provider Agreements under Medicare, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,121 (1994) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b)).
355. Provider Agreements under Medicare, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,120 (1994) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)).
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sonnel necessary to perform the screening must be "qualified medical
personnel." Those physicians who serve on a facility's "on-call" list will
define, in part, what the hospital's capabilities are for particular services.
4. Stabilizing Treatment356
Those services, including laboratory and related functions, that are cus-
tomarily available to patients at the hospital must be utilized to stabilize a
patient.
5. Delay in Treatment357
A hospital may not delay its screening or treatment of a patient in or-
der to determine an individual's ability to pay for the services. If the
hospital's routine registration process does not impede the patient's
screening and potential stabilizing treatment it may include questions
about the patient's ability to pay.358 This process, if undertaken, must be
administered in a uniform manner to all patients in the emergency room
area.
3 5 9
6. Conditions of Transfer3 60
In the course of a transfer certain requirements must be met including
necessary treatment during transfer, appropriate medical information,
and acceptance by another hospital and physician for transfer purposes.
It is not the transferring hospital's responsibility to provide transportation
services but the particular needs of the patient must be determined by the
transferring physician.
Z Specialized Capabilities of Accepting Facilities361
A hospital that accepts a transfer must offer all of its routinely avail-
able services including those that are specialized such as burn units,
shock-trauma units, neo-natal intensive care, or regional referral centers
in rural areas. If a patient requires services beyond what a hospital has
the capacity to offer it may decline the transfer. If the individual is a
patient in a hospital outside of the United States it is not necessary for a
hospital with specialized capabilities 362 to accept the patient.
356. Provider Agreements under Medicare, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,121 (1994) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(c)).
357. Provider Agreements under Medicare, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,121 (1994) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(c)(3)).
358. Id.
359. 59 Fed. Reg. at 32,099.
360. Provider Agreements under Medicare, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,122 (1994) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)).
361. Provider Agreements under Medicare, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,122 (1994) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(e)).
362. Although there is no regulatory detail that expands the description of what consti-
tutes "specialized capabilities" at least one region office of the Health Care Financing Ad-




If a hospital suspects that a violation has occurred it is required to re-
port to the Health Care Financing Administration; failure to report could
result in termination from the Medicare program for the hospital failing
to make the report.
C. MENTAL HEALTH SERVICE ISSUES
1. Marketing and Admission Practices
The Treatment Facilities Marketing Practices Act364 (Act) was enacted
to curb many of the abusive practices that led to investigations and litiga-
tion by the Attorney General in the mental health service industry. The
Act affects marketing and referral arrangements, the manner in which
representations are made to prospective patients, and the manner in
which the intake, assessment, and admission procedures are handled.365
A. Qualified Mental Health Referral Service.366 Referral services
have historically been operated by facilities or organized groups of li-
censed providers to inform the public of the availability of their services
and to direct an inquirer to a specific provider. The abuses that occurred
in the mental health service area resulted in the regulation of these refer-
ral services. To operate a qualified mental health referral service, the ser-
vice must meet a number of requirements including:
(1) the service may not exclude a potential participating (health
care) provider due to that participant's affiliation or non-affilia-
tion with other participants;
(2) payments by a participant for the service may not be related to
volume or value of referrals; 367
(3) participants may not be restricted in their ability to provide
professional services and may not charge patients referred from
a service at a higher rate than other non-service patients;368
(4) referrals may only be made to facilities operated or maintained
by the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation;369
(5) service must be staffed and assessments made by licensed
mental health professionals;370
(6) referrals are made on a rotational basis to at least three mental
health professionals where possible;
accepting hospital and not available at the transferring facility. HCFA Region VI, Depart-
ment of Health Standards and Quality, Dallas, Texas.
363. Provider Agreements under Medicare, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,120 (1994) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.20).
364. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 164.001-.014 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (Treat-
ment Facilities Marketing And Admissions Practices Act).
365. Id.
366. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.007(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
367. Id. § 164.007(a)(2).
368. Id. § 164.007(a)(3).
369. Id § 164.007(a)(4).
370. Id. § 164.007(a)(6).
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(7) person's identity seeking referral may not be disclosed;371
(8) disclosure of relationship between service and those receiving
referrals including fee payments and selection criteria;372
(9) maintenance of records on disclosures; 373
(10) disclosure of tolls or fees to make inquiry to a referral.374
B. Disclosures and Representations.375 Specific information must be
made available to a prospective patient prior to admission including (1)
the estimated average daily charge for inpatient facility services (2) the
fact that professional fees may be charged separately from facility fees,
(3) the name of the possible attending professional and (4) a bill of
rights. 376
Specific representations that may not be made include:377
(1) misrepresentation about insurance coverage available to the pa-
tient and the amount for which the patient will be responsible; 378
(2) statements about involuntary commitment related to leaving
against medical advice unless made by a physician; 379
(3) statements that the patient's insurance company may deny pay-
ment if the patient leaves against medical advice;380
(4) recommendation of admission to a mental health facility without
the evaluation by a licensed physician;381 or
(5) recommendation of admission to a chemical dependency facility
without the evaluation of a mental health professional. 382
C. Prohibited Acts. 383 A person or entity is prohibited from making
claims that involve: (1) promises of cure or guarantees that can not be
substantiated,384 (2) unsubstantiated claims,385 (3) the availability of in-
tervention services unless they meet all statutory requirements,386 (4) fail-
ure to disclose relationships between entities soliciting patients and
entities or individuals treating the patients, 387 or (5) obtaining confiden-
tial information for the purpose of securing referrals. 388
371. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.007(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
372. Id. § 164.007(a)(8).
373. Id. § 164.007(a)(9).
374. Id. § 164.007(a)(10).
375. Id. § 164.009(b)-(e).
376. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 88 321.001-.004 (Vernon Supp. 1995). See
also supra Part XI.B.2.
377. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.009 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
378. Id. § 164.009(b).
379. Id § 164.009(c)(1).
380. Id. § 164.009(c)(2).
381. Id § 164.009(d).
382. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.009(e) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
383. Id
384. Id § 164.010(1)(A).
385. Id. § 164.010(1)(B).
386. Id. § 164.010(2).
387. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.010(3) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
388. Id. § 164.010(4).
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D. Intake, Assessment, and Admission Processes.389 A patient in the
process of admission shall have certain explanations and determinations
made including the following:
(1) a review of the patient's finances and insurance benefits;39°
(2) an explanation of patient's rights;391
(3) an explanation of the facility's services and treatment
processes; 392
(4) an appropriate assessment made by an appropriately licensed
and credentialed mental health professional; 393 and
(5) acceptance for admission only after a signed physician's order
and acceptance by facility administration. 394
2. Abuse, Neglect, or Unprofessional Conduct in Health Care
Facilities395
A. Reports of Abuse, Neglect, or Unprofessional Conduct. Amend-
ments to the Health and Safety Code require an employee, volunteer, or
any other person associated with the operation of an inpatient mental
health facility or unit that provides comprehensive medical rehabilitation
services who believes that the mental or physical well being of a patient
receiving chemical dependency, mental health, or rehabilitation services
may or will be affected by abuse or neglect to report the information to
the agency that licenses the facility.396 If a health care professional be-
lieves that an employee or a facility has or will engage in the conduct
described above, that person shall report the information to the facility's
licensing agency.397
An employer of an employee who has made a report may not take
retaliatory action against that employee without subjecting the facility to
injunctive relief and actual and exemplary damages.398 Retaliation
against an individual who is not an employee and who has made a report
will subject the facility to injunctive relief and actual and exemplary dam-
ages including those based on mental anguish. 399
B. Sexual Exploitation. A mental health services provider is liable to
a patient or former patient if the patient suffers physical, mental, or emo-
tional injury resulting from sexual contact, sexual exploitation, or thera-
peutic deception from the provider.400 A mental health services provider
or employer has a duty to report if there is a reasonable cause to suspect
389. Id. § 572.0025(b)(d)(f).
390. Id. § 572.0025(b)(1).
391. Id. § 572.0025(b)(2).
392. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 572.0025(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
393. Id. § 572.0025(c)-(e).
394. Id. § 572.0025(f).
395. Id. § 161.132.
396. Id. § 161.132(a), (b).
397. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.132(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
398. Id. § 161.134.
399, Id. § 161.135.
400. TEX. CIv. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 81.002 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
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sexual exploitation or a patient has alleged such not later than 30 days
after the allegation or the reasonable cause became known to any mental
health licensing agency or the county prosecuting attorney.40'
XV. TAX RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
A. CHARITY CARE REQUIREMENTS OF NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS
Legislation passed in 1993402 defines the duties of a non-profit hospital
to provide charity care to its community. The legislation requires the hos-
pital to plan for the delivery of charity care through a budgeted process
that includes the development of a community benefits plan and the pub-
lic disclosure of the results of the plan in an annual report to the Texas
Department of Health (TDH).40 3 Failure to provide the charity care sub-
jects the hospital to possible loss of exemption from ad valorem,
franchise, and sales taxes.
1. Community Benefit Standards4°4
The legislation provides for four alternative standards that a hospital
may choose to meet to maintain its tax exempt status:
A. charity care including government-sponsored indigent care is
provided at a level that meets the reasonable needs of the com-
munity, taking into account the hospital's available resources and
the tax-exempt benefits that the hospital receives;40 5
B. charity care including government-sponsored indigent care is pro-
vided in an amount equal to at least four percent of the hospital's
net patient revenue;4°6
C. charity care including government-sponsored indigent care is pro-
vided in an amount equal to at least one hundred percent of the
hospital's tax-exempt benefits, excluding federal income tax;40 7 or
D. prior to January 1, 1996, charity care and community benefits
equal to at least five percent of the hospital's net patient revenue.
Of this combined amount, at least three percent of the hospital's
net patient revenue must have been provided to charity and gov-
ernment-sponsored indigent care patients.40 8 After December
31, 1995 the charity and government indigent care three percent
standard increases to at least four percent. 40 9
401. Id. § 81.006.
402. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 311.041-.048 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (Duties
of Nonprofit Hospitals).
403. Id.
404. Id. § 311.045.
405. Id. § 311.045(b)(1)(A).
406. Id § 311.045(b)(1)(B).
407. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANNm. § 311.045(b)(1)(C) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
408. Id. § 311.045(b)(1)(D).
409. Id. § 311.045(b)(1)(E).
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The legislation defines several terms that have varying meaning in the
health care industry410 including charity care,411 community benefits,412
government-sponsored indigent health care,413 government-sponsored
program unreimbursed costs, 4 14 and unreimbursed costs among other
terms.
2. Community Benefits Plan415
In addition to a mission plan for the hospital, the legislation requires
that a community benefit plan be developed that includes at least the
following:416
A. a method for assessing the plan's effectiveness that involves sur-
veying the community;
B. defined measurable objectives with completion dates; and
C. a budget.
3. Annual Report417
An annual report must be filed with TDH that includes the following:
(1) the hospital's mission statement, 41 8 (2) an identification of the health
care needs of the community that were utilized in developing the commu-
nity benefits plan,419 and (3) an itemization of charity care and commu-
nity benefits in amounts and types of benefit.420 Failure to timely file the
report subjects the hospital to a $1000 a day penalty.4 21 The hospital
must make the report available to the public and notify the public of its
availability.422
4. Availability of Charity Care423
To meet one of the legislation's purposes of making available charity
care, a hospital must develop a means of accomplishing this purpose
through the provision of information to those who may seek charity serv-
ices and the development of policies and procedures related to admission
of charity patients which would include an eligibility system involving in-
come levels and federal poverty guidelines.4 24
410. Id. § 311.042(14).
411. Id. § 311.042(1).
412. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 311.042(2) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
413. Id. § 311.042(6).
414. Id. § 311.042(7).
415. Id. §§ 311.044(c).
416. Id. § 311.044(c).
417. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 311.046 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
418. Id § 311.046(a)(1).
419. Id. § 311.046(a)(2).
420. Id. § 311.046(a)(3).
421. Id § 311.047
422. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 311.046(c) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
423. Id. § 311.041.




This legislation defines certain types of hospitals that are not subject to
its requirements in whole or in part.
A. Exempt hospitals include hospital authorities and districts and
hospitals operated by cities or counties; 426
B. Exemptions that require continued planning or reporting include
(1) those hospitals that do not charge patients or receive pay-
ments from other sources, (2) hospitals located in counties with a
population less than 50,000 and that have been designated as a
health professional shortage area, (3) hospitals designated as a
Medicaid disproportionate share provider, and (4) hospitals lo-
cated in Potter and Randall counties.427
C. Exemption may also be granted to a hospital that demonstrates
that (1) meeting the charity requirement would financially impact
the hospital causing a violation of bond requirements, (2) com-
pliance would jeopardize the hospital's continued operation, or
(3) a disaster has forced the hospital to substantially reduce its
operations. 428
B. FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION GUIDELINES RELATED
TO PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT
An agreement 429 between the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the
Hermann Hospital Estate (Hermann) provides guidelines that are in-
structive to hospitals that are exempt under Internal Revenue Code sec-
tion 501(c)(3)430 with respect to physician recruitment. Although the
agreement is specific to Hermann which operates Hermann Hospital in
Houston, Texas it is perceived industry-wide as an indicator of how IRS
will review business practices in this highly competitive aspect of health
care.
The business practice of physician recruiting typically involves offering
a number of incentives for a physician to locate his or her practice in an
area associated with a particular hospital or clinic. The legal issues re-
lated to offering such incentives involve several areas including fraud and
abuse (federal antikickback statute,431 Stark II legislation,432 the Texas
illegal remuneration statute,433 commercial bribery,434 and federal tax ex-
emption. The Hermann agreement, and this comment, relates to tax ex-
emption, in particular, tax law regarding "private inurement. ''435
425. Id. §§ 311.042(9)(B), 311.043(c).
426. Id. § 311.042(9)(B).
427. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 311.042(9)(B), 311.045(b) (Vernon Supp.
1995).
428. Id. § 311.043(c).
429. Hermann Hosp. Agreement, 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA), at 1519-24 (Oct. 20, 1994).
430. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 1994).
431. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1988 & Supp. 1993).
432. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. V 1993).
433. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 161.091-.094 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
434. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43(b) (Vernon 1994)
435. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 1994).
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1. Community Benefit Requirement
In order for Hermann to satisfy the IRS that its prospective handling of
physician recruitment would meet the underlying purposes of a tax ex-
empt, charitable organization it agreed that the following conditions
would be followed in demonstrating community need for the physician: 436
A. a deficiency in the number of physicians to the population's need
for that particular type of physician;
B. a documented need for the particular medical service based upon
the unavailability of the type of physician or lengthy delays in
scheduling appointments;
C. the area in which the physician is to be located is designated as a
"Health Professional Shortage Area" as designated by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services;
D. a demonstrated difficulty in securing physicians to relocate to the
area or hospital due to its location;
E. an anticipated reduction in the number of physicians in a particu-
lar practice specialty that could be documented (for example, re-
tirement); and
F. a documented shortage of physicians serving indigent or Medicaid
patients in the hospital's service area.
2. Limitation on Incentives
Under the agreement, permissible incentives can be grouped into two
categories, those requiring repayment and those not requiring
repayment.437
A. Repayment is not expected for expenses such as actual moving
expenses, relocation costs, and interview travel costs;
B. repayment is not expected for other incentives in the form of sub-
sidies for office space rental, overhead expenses, or equipment
subsidies but only if there were no income guarantees to the
physician;
C. loans, lines of credit, and loan guarantees are permissible so long
as the terms are representative of commercially available financ-
ing and repayment is made; and
D. income guarantees must be reasonable in the amounts involved,
limited to no more than two years, no incentives "off the agree-
ment" and amounts advanced are to be treated as a loan to be
repaid.
436. 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1522 (Oct. 20, 1994).
437. Id. at 1523-24.
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